Peer review: Michael Holden
Chief Executive, Directly Operated Railways
Philip Haigh has neatly summed up this Gordian knot, which has been metaphorically trussed up with a pretty pink ribbon and deposited on ORR’s doorstep.
Let’s start with the infrastructure enhancement schemes, of which there are still too few to enable the route to be properly developed. The Werrington flyunder is a critical next step, proposed for CP5 but not yet committed. This would enable grade separated access for freight trains bound for the GN/GE Joint Line (which has recently been upgraded at significant cost), thus enabling more paths for fast trains between Peterborough and Doncaster.
But there are a number of other flat junctions on the route that also restrict capacity and act as timetabling and performance hot spots - the flat crossing at Newark prevents a proper service operating between Lincoln and Nottingham; at Doncaster itself, where trains cross on the flat to and from the Thorne line and the West Riding; and Skelton Junction, north of York. All these need grade-separated junctions to unlock desperately-needed capacity.
The currently abandoned Leamside route needs re-opening to unblock capacity between Darlington and Newcastle. North of Newcastle, there is a need for shorter headway signalling and improved overtaking facilities. Finally, Portobello Junction, east of Edinburgh, needs rebuilding as a double junction.
Then there is the use of capacity that government can control through franchise specification. At the south end of the route, a 125mph higher-capacity commuter service ought to be specified to service Huntingdon to Newark, with extensions to Spalding and Lincoln (with associated electrification);. Thameslink trains should turn round at Huntingdon with a reinstated dive-under. And Thameslink peak trains running north of Welwyn Garden City should all be specified at 12 cars, to optimise use of capacity. So franchise re-specification could make much more effective use of capacity over the Fens and through the two-track Welwyn section.
Taken together, these schemes would provide enough capacity on the whole route to operate all the existing franchise and open access applications and retain a CrossCountry service hourly to Scotland - but require another billion or two of (recoverable) investment and perhaps ten years to build.
Until such time as all this might be achieved, how should ORR determine the existing applications in its in-tray? The answer: with the greatest of difficulty and in the expectation of legal challenge whichever way it jumps!
This goes to the heart of the railway legal structure set up to enable privatisation. Open access is enshrined in the 1993 Railways Act, but the harsh reality is that it is really in conflict with the franchised system, at least in respect of long-distance services. Network planning is really difficult on a railway where there is no financial level playing field. Open access players pay only their marginal costs on the network, whereas franchisees contribute towards the fixed costs, as does government through the network grant. It is time that this is unpicked, otherwise this problem will recur and worsen.
Cutting the Gordian knot will require bold action by ORR to plump for one side of this argument or the other. I hope we don’t get an unworkable compromise outcome. Longer term, the solution is more investment in capacity and structural reform of capacity planning and charging.
